Do Company Builders Create Jobs? Examining the Rise of Incubation Finance in Germany by Scheuplein, Christoph & Kahl, Julian
www.ssoar.info
Do Company Builders Create Jobs? Examining the
Rise of Incubation Finance in Germany
Scheuplein, Christoph; Kahl, Julian
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Scheuplein, C., & Kahl, J. (2017). Do Company Builders Create Jobs? Examining the Rise of Incubation Finance in
Germany. (IAT Discussion Papers, 2017-1). Gelsenkirchen: Institut Arbeit und Technik (IAT). https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54946-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
1 / 19 
Christoph Scheuplein, Julian Kahl 
   
DISCUSSION PAPER 
17|01 
      
Do Company Builders Create Jobs? 
Examining the Rise of Incubation Fi-
nance in Germany  
2 / 19 
  
Copyright remains with the author. 
 
Discussion papers of the IAT serve to disseminate the research results of work in 
progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic de-
bate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publica-
tion and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers pub-
lished by the IAT represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the insti-
tute as a whole.  
 
Front Cover: Oberbaum Bridge, Berlin. Source: Fotolia.  
 Scheuplein, Christoph; Kahl, Julian (2017): Do Company Builders Create Jobs? Examining the Rise of Incubation Finance in Germany. 




























© IAT 2017 
3 / 19 
 
Do Company Builders Create Jobs?  
Examining the Rise of Incubation Finance in Germany 
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1 Introduction 
Traditionally, business incubation has been as-sociated with government-provided support for start-ups based on a combination of finance, knowledge and infrastructure (Allen and McKluskey 1990; Phan, Mian, and Lamine 2016). Over the last ten years, new forms of private incubators have emerged that combine these elements in new ways (Hansen et al. 2000; Ben-dig, Evers, and Knirsch 2013; Dee et al. 2015). At least two major trends can be identified that have laid the foundation for a new player in incubation finance – the so-called company builder. The first trend is related to programs launched by accelerators that provided support to start-ups for a limited amount of time. Exam-ples of internationally recognized accelerators are Y Combinator, TechStars, Seedcamp and Startupbootcamp.  A second trend is the seriali-zation and institutionalization of support activi-ties for forming new firms, including such di-verse contributions as software programming, human resources and marketing. This phenom-enon has been referred to as “start-up studio”, “start-up factory” or “venture builder” (Szigeti 2016); however, we refer to these players as company builders. Although the concept of com-pany builders was pioneered in the United States (e.g. the Idealab, founded in 1996), these types of incubators appear to be gaining traction outside the US (Szigeti 2015).  The performance of various types of venture capital (VC) investors has been relatively well documented, yet few studies have addressed the role of company builders in particular. An im-portant reason for the lack of empirical results concerning company builders may be related to data restrictions. For both classic and public VC firms and start-ups, there are incentives to make information regarding equity investment deci-sions available to the public. In part, such deci-sions are made public owing to regulatory re-quirements, as a part of the disclosure require-ments to investors or as a signal to competition. At the same time, start-ups represent independ-ent ventures about which information is report-
ed in a range of databases. However, with re-spect to company builders, the financing and growth of start-ups take place within an over-arching corporation that may bundle various start-ups under one roof. Often financial infor-mation is reported only in consolidated financial statements, which is why information about individual start-up firms is not available. This lack of disclosure tends to change as start-ups grow, raise additional external finance and pre-pare to exit, at which time the company builder’s equity stakes are reduced.  Company builders seem to be particularly well established in the German VC market. In part, this result may be attributed to the success of Rocket Internet, the largest company builder worldwide. On the one hand, Rocket Internet has engaged in several successful and large exits; on the other hand, several former Rocket employ-ees launched their own company builder after leaving the firm. Their business model was also imitated by other investors. Against this back-drop, we compared the corporate performance of company builder–backed start-ups with the performance of start-ups that received financing from other types of investors. Given the political and economic importance of employment in young ventures, we used the growth of these firms as the benchmark in measuring their per-formance.  This study is structured as follow. First, in sec-tion 2, we discuss company builders as a new investor type. Section 3 provides an overview of company builder activity in Germany, and on this basis, we derived hypotheses as described in section 4. In sections 5 and 6, respectively, the data sources are introduced and the descriptive and regression results are reported. In section 7, we summarize our findings and draw some con-clusions.         
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2 The Development of Busi-
ness Incubation 
Business incubation refers to institution-alized support for new ventures in which sup-port for new firms may bundle various different activities (Allen and McCluskey 1990, 62; Aernoudt 2004, 128; Hackett and Dilts 2004, 57, 79). This broad definition thus includes such varied organizations as business incubators, technology parks and co-working spaces; how-ever, we use a more narrow definition of busi-ness incubation that distinguishes between dif-ferent types of incubators. Here, we refer to business incubation as a form of VC finance that comprises four functions (Engelmann 2000, 331–332; Brettel, Rudolf and Witt 2005, 136–137): (1) non-financial support is provided (of-fice spaces and commercial facilities, communi-cation infrastructure); (2) advice is provided in specific fields, including management, legal af-fairs, taxes, software, human resources and technological development; (3) start-ups benefit from the company builder’s network of suppliers and customers’ investors ; and (4) new ventures receive equity finance from company builders. This definition clearly distinguishes com-pany builders from the more traditional types of VC finance, because the latter provide only lim-ited consulting and brokerage services. Also, business angels are not subsumed under this definition, because these players tend to concen-trate on providing consulting and brokerage activities. Moreover, classic technology parks that focus on providing office space and com-mercial sites are also exempt from this defini-tion, because they typically do not engage in the financing of new ventures. Although business incubation is a reaction to the high level of com-plexity associated with the process of creating and growing new firms (OECD 1999), the provi-sion of additional finance becomes necessary only under specific circumstances. Typically, this includes fast-cycle industry environments char-acterized by rapid technological advancement in which traditional finance is not appropriate. 
Business incubation is most promising in envi-ronments where time is the major constraining factor, and thus first-mover advantages play an important role. In these situations, business incubation may allow start-ups to rapidly pro-gress along the learning curve, enabling them to considerably reduce the time to market.  The concept business incubation originat-ed in the publicly financed science and technolo-gy parks in the US (Mian 2016, 6) for which such funding augmented the classic support functions in terms of infrastructure, consulting and bro-kerage. The first noteworthy number of private incubators was reported in the 1970s; later, corporations adopted the practice of business incubation in the form of corporate incubation. In the 1990s, the information and communica-tion sector attracted major levels of funding. First and foremost, this sector comprised inter-net-based services that provided network goods associated with particularly high first-mover advantages. With the emergence of the New Economy between 1995 and 2001, a new inves-tor type gained traction, the so-called “net-worked incubators” (Hansen et al. 2000; Bølling-toft and Ulhøi 2005; Bruneel et al. 2012, 112). Hansen et al. (2000, 76) showed that these in-vestors focused in particular on internet-based services and central locations, which enabled these start-ups to access internal and external networks. A novel element associated with the networked incubator was the more comprehen-sive internalization of business functions. The investors supported start-ups in recruitment, controlling and marketing and also provided financial resources in these areas. The success of this institutional innovation led to the first sub-stantial increase in the number of private incu-bators (Leblebici and Shah 2004, 368). These investors were also observed in Germany (Achleitner and Engel 2001). As a late adopter of this investment model, Germany was under considerable pressure during the crash of the Neuer Markt, a high-tech segment of the stock exchange that had been launched in Germany in 1997. As a consequence, the number of incuba-tors, as well as the funds and support functions 
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they provided, decreased considerably in the years that followed (Witt and Zilmer 2002; Bret-tel, Rudolf, and Witt 2005).  The decline in these new investors was also discernible in other countries. Starting in 2004, stabilization of the information and com-munications technology (ICT) market (Web 2.0) led to a renewed surge in incubators, while at the same time they learned from past blunders. Accelerators place a strong emphasis on specific contents over a relatively short time frame. The support provided to start-ups in the form of business and technical consulting is highly struc-tured and standardized and is limited to a period of a few weeks or months. With respect to fi-nance, seed financing of no more than a few thousand US dollars is commonly provided (Mil-ler and Bound 2011, 9). Accelerators often struc-ture their programs to include selection proce-dures, courses with a limited number of partici-pants and a final presentation with potential investors (“Demo Day”). Additional support activities that are available first and foremost in established start-up hubs include, among other things, seminars that cover new firm formation, start-up weekends and founder’s roundtables.  Compared with accelerators, company builders provide start-ups with a considerably more extensive portfolio of services. These in-vestors make available a substantially larger amount of resources for the growth of firms and deploy these resources to various start-ups sim-ultaneously (Rao 2013). The experience of suc-cessful entrepreneurs becomes institutionalized within these organizations, thus enabling the founders to progress more rapidly along the learning curve. Learning takes place not only between the company-builder team and the start-ups, but also between the portfolio firms within the organization. Because this approach to supporting the growth of young firms is asso-ciated with high costs, company builders seek comprehensive control of the start-up process, which is often achieved in the form of majority stakes. The term “start-up studios” refers to film studios and illustrates that both proprietary projects and projects brought into the organiza-
tion from the outside may be pursued using the existing infrastructure. However, company builders launch more business ideas and strate-gies internally than do other types of investors. Copycat strategies represent an extreme form of this phenomenon and include the cloning of existing business models aimed at increasing performance.  Thus, the strategies of both accelerators and company builders minimize the typical problem of information asymmetry and moral hazard associated with the launch of new firms, albeit in different ways. In the accelerator model, uncertainty and risk remain on the side of the start-up owing to the relatively small invest-ments. Accelerators reduce some of the uncer-tainty within the start-up process by passing it on to the investor in the next phase. By contrast, company builders accept a much greater risk (or even the entire risk) while at the same time as-suming full control of the start-up-process. Be-tween these extremes, there are additional in-vestors. Often such investors offer a broader portfolio of support activities than do regular VC firms, such as providing the premises for the start-up; however, they tend not to engage in capital-intensive functions to finance the expan-sion of young firms. These (empirically rare) investors are referred to as “traditional incuba-tors” and will be compared with company build-ers, accelerators and classic VC investors (see Table 1). The first wave of the different types of incuba-tion finance sketched out here was pioneered in the 1990s and after 2005 in the United States. However, after 2010 at the latest, incubation finance began to expand internationally. At the same time, however, the launch of incubator firms stagnated in the United States (Miller and Bound 2011; Szigeti 2015). Against this back-drop, it is necessary to clarify which institutional context is most appropriate for incubation fi-nance.  Hansen et al. (2000, 84) refer to “networked incubators” as a novel and superior organiza-tional form because they combine the resources of large corporations with the agility of start-
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ups. It is thus expected that accelerators and company builders represent successful institu- tional innovations in the networked society (Le-blebici and  Shah 2004, 369).  Table 1: Different Types of Incubation Funding, as compared with Classic Venture Capital Investors  
 Venture Capital Incubation Funding Accelerator Traditional In-cubator Company Build-er 
Conception Finance and know-how Training camp Comprehensive support, including busi-ness premises 
Internal control or majority stake in new venture 
Duration Life of fund Days to months Several years Several years 
Compensation Equity Fee or equity Equity Majority stake or complete inter-nalization 
Support 
financing  
√ √ √ √ 
Coaching √ √ √ √ 
Network integration √ √ √ √ 
Business premises   √ √ 
ICT infrastructure   √ √ 
IT and programming     √ 
Marketing    √ 
Recruitment    √ 
Objective for exit Next investment phase Presentation to potential inves-tors 
Long-term own-ership (strategic investor, IPO) 
Long-term own-ership (strategic investor, IPO) IPO = initial public offering; IT = information technology.  Source: Author.   In contrast to previous organizational forms, incubation finance not only includes the support of business ideas but also is associated with serializing the launch of new firms (Bendig, Evers, and Knirsch 2013, 81). In doing so, the new venture creation process becomes replica-ble based on standardized modules. Although accelerators tend to provide the general tools for the start-up process, company builders engage in the strategic development of a company. The business idea is thus the scarce resource, which illustrates the limits related to incubation fi-nance. With the entry of company builders, en-trepreneurs must cede control of much of their venture. It may thus be assumed that company builders are more attractive to founders within ecosystems where financial and entrepreneurial 
resources are not widely available and where technological change is rapid. By contrast, if such resources are not lacking, traditional VC invest-ments that have a considerably more nimble service portfolio may be more appropriate. Company builders may thus be expected to be more effective in specific innovation systems and sectoral contexts.     
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3 Company Building in Germa-
ny  
An assessment of the different forms of incuba-tion finance that are sketched out here is availa-ble only in the form of explorative studies (Mil-ler and Bound 2011; Salido, Sabás, and Freixas 2013; Szigeti 2015). These studies link the high rates of new-firm formation to incubation fi-nance in Europe in the years 2010 and 2013. Germany also experienced a boom during these two years with respect to the availability of VC finance and the formation of incubators (Heim-lich 2013; Bendig, Evers, and Knirsch 2013, 80–87; Garbs 2014; Kahl and Scheuplein 2016, 31–33). In the year 2013, which marks a peak in this development, established firms increasingly engaged in incubation finance by launching their own corporate accelerators, and this trend is ongoing (Kawohl, Rack, and Strniste 2015). The surge in private company builder activity is strongly associated with the formation of Rocket Internet in the year 2007. The history of this particular company builder may be traced back to the year 1999 (Kaczmarek 2014; Schim-oroszik 2015, 117–120). As a consequence of the rapid growth of selected start-ups, as well as of several successful exits, other company builders were formed, including Team Europe (2008), HitFox (2011), Rheingau Founders (2011), M Cube (2011) and Project A Ventures (2012). In this context, local knowledge transfer, as well as direct linkages among and continuities of per-sonnel, have played an important role. In Mu-nich, Hamburg and Cologne, a smaller number of new company builders were also formed. How-ever, in 2013, the company builder business model faced its first crisis, when several compa-ny builders had to narrow their portfolios or adjust their strategies (Hofmann 2013; Kroker 2014). Although Rocket Internet, which had strongly emphasized a copycat strategy (Rooney 2012), was adversely affected by such turbu-lence, this firm was able to continue its devel-opment towards becoming a major global inter-net concern (Kaczmarek 2014, 265–321). Sub-
sequently, company building activity stabilized. In addition, further company builders were cre-ated with a focus on particular sectors (e.g. fi-nancial technology [“fintech”]). In 2016, a total of 20 company builders were identified in Ger-many.  The growth of company builders occurred against the backdrop of a weak VC market in Germany (Kulicke 2012; Röhl 2014). The de-scriptive results reported here show that the publicly available VC funding attributable to company builders (i.e. Rocket Internet in partic-ular) amounted to €1.2bn. The VC funding in-vested by company builders was thus twice as high as the amount attributable to private inves-tors (InvestEurope/PEREP Analytics 2016). Compared with the US, the catch-up process of Germany’s VC market seems to be closely tied to company builders, and some characteristics of this business model seem to be particularly well suited to well-known elements of the German innovation system (Keck 1993; Allen 2010; Schmoch, Rammer, and Legler 2010), as follows: 
• In Germany, innovation tends to be im-plemented by methods that involve in-cremental change. Such strengths – in-cluding a detail-orientated, collaborative and rapid approach – may be deployed in applying innovations derived from the in-formation and communication sector to different industries.  
• The method-based approach prevalent in the German innovation system facilitates the sequential reproduction of business models. From this perspective, the copy-cat strategy seems to be particularly promising.  
• Highly qualified individuals willing to cede some of their entrepreneurial self-determination are essential for the com-pany builder business model. The high prestige afforded to long-term employ-ment and large corporations seems to benefit company builders as well.  All these factors indicate that among the vari-ous alternatives for launching and funding 
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new firms (Kulicke 2012, 27–33), company builders seem to be particularly promising.      
4 Current State of Research 
and Hypotheses 
Assessing the employment effects of VC invest-ments is a well-developed field of inquiry (e.g. Da Rin, Hellmann, and Puri 2013: 633pp.). Both microeconomic effects (Engel 2002; Achleitner and Kloeckner 2005) and macroeconomic effects (Belke, Fehn, and Foster 2006; Feldmann 2010) associated with VC investments have been re-ported for the German labour market. The in-vestment strategies of different types of VC in-vestors have also been compared (Bertoni, Co-lombo, and Grilli 2013; Bertoni, Colombo, and Quas 2015). The initial studies dealt with busi-ness incubation in a general sense (Grimaldi and Grandi 2005; Stokan, Thompson, and Mahu 2015; Mian 2016, 12–17), whereas the specific type of incubation funding examined here has not (to our knowledge) been investigated in any previous study.  In our study, we focused on the two extremes of incubation funding, combining the accelerators with the empirically few cases of traditional incubation.  As company builders provide a substantially more comprehensive set of support activities to their portfolio firms, we expect more dynamic employment growth among these firms com-pared with companies that did not receive such funding (Hypothesis 1).  Given the considerably higher amount of finan-cial resources used in company builders to facili-tate the development of their portfolio firms, as compared with accelerators, we would expect company builder firms to exhibit considerably higher employment growth rates than the latter types of VC investors (Hypothesis 2).  Over the past five years, Berlin has witnessed rapid growth in the availability of VC finance, becoming the most important hub for VC in Germany (Scheuplein, Görtz, and Henke 2014). We tested whether firms operating in Berlin 
generally exhibited higher growth rates com-pared with firms outside Berlin, or whether firms in company builders grew more dynami-cally. We expected Berlin-based start-ups in company builders to be positively associated with firm growth, whereas no such relationship would be observed for firms that did not receive funding from a Berlin-based company builder (Hypothesis 3).   Although VC and incubation activity is observed in various industries, investors tend to favour specific industries. In the time period of our study, VC and incubation funding concentrated on the digital economy, in which the first-mover advantages sketched out above are of substan-tial importance. The acquisition of finance could thus play a decisive role for the employment growth of start-ups. Therefore, we expected the information and communication industry, as well as electronic commerce (e-commerce), to be particularly well-suited targets for company building activities, which is why we expected the firms operating in these industries to be posi-tively associated with growth (i.e. exhibiting the highest growth rates) (Hypothesis 4).   
5 Methods 
5.1 Data The empirical analysis is based on the mer-gers and acquisitions (M&A) database Zephyr (Bureau van Dijk) and Deal News (Majunke Consulting). Both databases were integrated and extended by the deal monitor of Venture-Capital Magazin (an industry magazine report-ing on German and European VC activity and deals). Information on VC activity in the years 2011 to 2015, as well as German portfolio firms and investors, was retrieved from these sources. In total, 1,236 portfolio firms were identified in these years. Additional infor-mation regarding the VC-backed firms (num-ber of employees, German industry code, loca-tion) was accessed via the Markus database, 
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which is operated by Creditreform and the Bureau van Dijk. Using this database, we also determined whether the portfolio firms were active. In total, 322 portfolio firms were iden-tified. Exits in the form of insolvencies, takeo-vers and IPOs were documented as well. In order to classify the different types of inves-tors, we used the Zephyr database as well as the Fund Manager Profiles database operated by Preqin. This allowed us to distinguish four types of investors: company builder, private accelerators, public VC firms and private VC firms. The empirically rare public accelerators were subsumed under the category public VC firms. While the first three types of investors were distinguished on the basis of a positive 
list, the fourth category of private VC includes classic VC firms and VC subsidiaries of in-vestment banks as well as corporate VC firms, family offices and business angels.  
5.2 Regression Model The determinants of employment growth in VC-backed firms and in start-ups that received incubation funding were examined on the basis of four regression models. For the de-pendent variable in models 1 and 2, we used employment growth (EMPL_GROW) of VC-backed firms and those firms that received incubation
 Y1= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x7 +x8+ x9 + x10+x11+x12+x13  (1) Y1= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x8+ x10+x11+x12+x13 +x14  (2) Y2= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x7 +x8+ x9 + x10   (3) Y2= x1+x2+ x3+x4+ x6+x8+ x10+ x14   (4)   Y1:EMPL_GROW Log (EMPLOYt1−EMPLOYt0) Y2:EV_GROWTH Log (EMPLOYt1/EMPLOYt0)/(t1−t0) X1:BERLIN Located in Berlin (1/0) X2:MUNICH Located in Munich (1/0) X3:ICT Portfolio firm is active in the information and communication industry (1/0) X4:ECOMMERCE Portfolio firm is active in wholesale, retail or e-commerce (1/0) X5:FINANCE Portfolio firm is active in financial services (1/0) X6:BIOTECH Portfolio firm is active in the life sciences (1/0) X7:PUBLIC_VC Portfolio firm received investment from at least one public VC firm (1/0)  X8:PRIVATE_ACCE Portfolio firm received investment from at least one private accelerator (1/0) X9:COMP_BUILD Portfolio firm received investment from at least one company builder (1/0) X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZE Number of employees in the year of initial financing X11:YEAR_2013 Initial year of financing (2013) (1/0) X12:YEAR_2012 Initial year of financing (2012) (1/0) X13: YEAR_2011 Initial year of financing (2011) (1/0) X14: BERLIN_CO_BU BERLIN_COMPANY_BUILDER N=322  
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finance. We gauged employment growth as the log growth over the initial funding in the years between 2011 and 2014 (EMPLOYt0) compared with the number of employees in 2015 (EMPLOYt1). In regression models 3 and 4, we examined employment growth (EV_GROWTH) on the basis of work by Evans (1987), where EMPLOYt1 relates to the num-ber of employees in 2015 and EMPLOYt0 re-lates to the number of employees in the year 
of the initial funding. Thus, t1−t0 computes the number of years between the initial year of funding and the reporting year 2015. To test whether portfolio firms in Berlin and Munich, the two most important centres for VC in Germany, exhibited higher employment growth rates than firms outside of these clus-ters, the independent variables BERLIN and MUNICH were used. In cases where the port-folio firms were located in either Berlin or Munich, a 0 was assigned. If the firms were headquartered outside of Berlin or Munich, a 1 was coded. Four binary independent varia-bles that tested for the effect of the industry in which the respective firms are operating were used. We examined whether there was a dif-ferential effect on employment growth rates across industries among information and communication technology firms (ICT); wholesale, retail and e-commerce firms (ECOMMERCE); financial services firms (FI-NANCE) and life sciences and biotechnology firms (BIOTECH). The classification of the portfolio firms draws on the work of Rammer et al. (2013) and is based on the industry codes reported for each firm (ICT services 58,2; 61 and 62; 63,01; 63,02; and 95,1; e-commerce 46 and 47; financial services 64 to 66; Life Sciences 21; 26.3; 26.6; 32.50.1; 32.50.3; 71.2; 72.11; 72.19; 86.10.1; and 86.10.3).  In order to test for the effect of different types of investors on employment growth rates, four independent variables were used. More spe-cifically, four binary variables were intro-
duced that tested whether the portfolio firm had re-ceived finance from a company builder (COMP_BUILD), a private accelerator (PRI-VATE_ACCE) or a public VC firm (PUBLIC_VC). To gauge the impact of Berlin-based company builders on firm growth, the interaction term between BERLIN and COMP_BUILD was com-puted (BERLIN_CO_BU). Due to multicollinear-ity between COMP_BUILD and BERLIN_CO_BU, two separate models were estimated that contained only one of the two variables.  Several controls were used. In all models, we controlled for log firm size in the initial year of finance (LOG_FIRM_SIZE). In the first two models, the year of the initial financing was employed, that is, the years 2013, 2012, and 2011 (YEAR _2013, YEAR_2012, YEAR_2011); the year 2014 was excluded. Because the year of the initial financing forms part of the de-pendent variable in models 3 and 4 for the dependent variable EV_GROWTH, we did not control for the initial year of financing in these models.   
6 Results 
6.1 Descriptives For the dependent variables EMPLOY_GROW and EV_GROWTH, the respective median val-ues were 2.46 and 1.13, with respective standard deviations of 1.39 and 0.86. For the four types of investors, we found varying me-dian values, which provided an overview of these investors’ activity in the German VC market. At 53%, more than half the firms in the sample had received at least one financing round by a public VC firm in the years 2014 to  2011, and 8% of the portfolio firms received
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Table 2. Descriptives and Correlations (Models 1 and 2) 
 Mean STD Y1 X1  X2  X3 X4  X5 X6 X7  X8  X9 X10 X11  X12 X13 X14 Y1: EMPLOY_GROW 2.46 1.39 1 0.16** -0.18 0.02 0.22** 0.03 -0.10* -0.20** -0.02 0.24** 0.43** -0.06 0.13* 0.09 0.22* X1: BERLIN 0.39 0.48 0.16** 1 -0.34** 0.23** 0.10** 0.02 -0.16** -0.11* 0.10** 0.21* 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.31** X2 :MUNICH 0.16 0.36 -0.18 0.34** 1 -0.12* 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 X3:ICT 0.36 0.48 0.02 0.23** -0.12* 1 -0.26** -0.08 -0.26** -0.12 0.11* 0.09 -0.12* 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.11* X4:ECOMMERCE 0.11 0.31 0.22** 0.10 0.03 -0.26** 1 -0.04 -0.12* -0.11* -0.04 0.11* 0.24** -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.11* X5:FINANCE 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 1 -0.04 -0.06 0.21** -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 X6:BIOTECH 0.11 0.31 -0.10* -0.16** -0.01 -0.26** -0.12* -0.04 1 -0.13* -0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.04 X7:PUBLIC_VC 0.53 0.50 -0.20** -0.11* 0.01 -0.12* -0.11* -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.08 -0.19** -0.16** -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.16** X8:PRIVATE_ACCE 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.11* -0.04 0.21** -0.04 -0.08 1 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 X9:COMPANY_BUILD 0.08 0.26 0.24** 0.21** -0.02 0.09 0.11* -0.03 -0.06 -0.19** -0.03 1 0.13* -0.06 0.08 -0.03  X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZE 2.12 1.49 0.43** 0.05 -0.05 -0.12* 0.22** -0.02 0.03 -0.16** -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.14* 0.05 0.11* 0.19** X11:YEAR_2013 0.25 0.43 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.14* 1 -0.32** -0.37** -0.05 X12:YEAR_2012 0.24 0.42 0.13* 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.32** 1 -0.36** 0.04 X13:YEAR_2011 0.29 0.45 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.11** -0.37** -0.36** 1 -0.04 X14: BERLIN_CO_BU 0.06 0.23 0.22** 0.31** -0.10 0.11* 0.11* -0.02 -0.04 -0.16** -0.03  0.19** -0.05 .0.04 -0.04 1 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 N=322   Table 3. Descriptives and Correlations (Models 3 and 4) 
 Mean STD Y1 X1  X2  X3 X4  X5 X6 X7  X8  X9 X10 X14 Y2: EV_GROWTH 1.13 0.86 1 0.18** -0.01 -0.01 0.15** 0.10 -0.11* -0.18** -0.01 0.19** 0.29** 0.23* X1: BERLIN 0.39 0.48 0.18** 1 -0.34** 0.23** 0.10** 0.02 -0.16** -0.11* 0.10** 0.21* 0.05 0.31* X2 :MUNICH 0.16 0.36 -0.01 0.34** 1 -0.12* 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 X3:ICT 0.36 0.48 -0.01 0.23** -0.12* 1 -0.26** -0.08 -0.26** -0.12 0.11* 0.09 -0.12* 0.11* X4:ECOMMERCE 0.11 0.31 0.5** 0.10 0.3 -0.26** 1 -0.04 -0.12* -0.11* -0.04 0.11* 0.24** 0.11* X5:FINANCE 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 1 -0.04 -0.06 0.21** -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 X6:BIOTECH 0.11 0.31 -0.11* -0.16** -0.01 -0.26** -0.12* -0.04 1 -0.13* -0.04 -006 0.03 -0.04 X7:PUBLIC_VC 0.53 0.50 -0.18** -0.11* 0.01 -0.12* -0.11* -0.06 0.13* 1 -0.08 -0.19** -0.16** -0.16** X8:PRIVATE_ACCE 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11* -0.04 0.21** -0.04 -0.08 1 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 X9:COMPANY_BUILD 0.08 0.26 0.19** 0.21** -0.02 0.09 0.11* -0.03 -0.06 -0.19** -0.03 1 0.13*  X10:LOG_FIRM_SIZE 2.12 1.49 0.29** 0.05 -0.05 -0.12* 0.22** -0.02 0.03 -0.16** -0.06 0.13* 1 0.19** X14: BERLIN_CO_BU 0.06 0.23 0.23** 0.31** -0.10 0.11* -0.11* -0.02 -0.04 -0.16** -0.03  0.19** 1 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 N
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financing from a company builder, whereas private accelerators were invested in only 2% of the firms in the sample. For 6% of the firms in the sample, a Berlin-based company builder was reported to be an investor. The number of initial financing rounds is relatively evenly spread across the years 2013 to 2011, in that 25% of the initial financing rounds were ob-served in 2013, 24% in 2012 and 29% in 2011. The remaining 22% were documented in the year 2014.  VC activity was strongly concentrated in se-lected metropolitan regions in that 40% of the firms in the sample were headquartered in Berlin, whereas 16% were located in Munich. Moreover, VC activity was also heavily con-centrated in certain industry sectors. With 40% of the firms in the sample operating in the information and communication industry, this particular industry is clearly dominant. Whereas 12% of the portfolio firms belonged to the wholesale and retail (i.e. e-commerce) industry, life science and biotechnology firms 
accounted for 10%. Financial services repre-sented only 1.2% of the firms in the sample.  
6.2 Regression Results The regression results provide support for Hypothesis 1, predicting a positive relation-ship between portfolio firms that were backed by company builders as compared with firms that did not receive such funding. Models 1 and 3 exhibited a positive and significant rela-tionship between COMP_BUILD and employ-ment growth rates. At the same time, models 1, 3 and 4 indicated a negative and significant impact of public VC funding on firm growth, albeit model 2 did not provide support for this relationship. The negative impact observed here may be due to policy considerations re-garding the provision of finance to young firms, particularly those in the early stages of development, as well as in fields where the risk of product
 Table 4. Regression Results Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4                                                                Regression coefficients (standard error) CONST 1.09 (0.22)*** 1.11 (0.22)*** 0.77 (0.12)*** 0.79 (0.12)*** X1: BERLIN 0.28 (0.15)* 0.27 (0.15)* 0.26 (0.10)** 0.23 (0.10)** X2: MUNICH 0.15 (0.19) 0.17 (0.19) 0.13 (0.13) 0.14 (0.13) X3: ICT 0.17 (0.16) 0.17 (0.16) -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) X4: ECOMMERCE 0.45 (0.23)** 0.46 (0.23)** 0.12 (0.15) 0.12 (0.15) X5: FINANCE 0.92 (0.62) 0.91 (0.62) 0.84 (0.42)** 0.84 (0.41)** X6: BIOTECH -0.28 (0.22) -0.29 (0.22) -0.20 (0.15) -0.21 (0.15) X7: PUBLIC_VC -0.27 (0.14)* -0.30 (0.14)* -0.15 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09)* X8: PRIVATE_ACCE -0.36 (0.,55) -0.38 (0.56) -0.21 (0.37) -0.20 (0.37) X9:  COMP_BUILD 0.66 (0.26)**  0.32 (0.17)*  X10: LOG_FIRM_SIZE 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.34 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** X11: YEAR_2013 0.47 (0.19)** 0.47 (0.19)**   X12: YEAR_2012 0.77 (0.19)*** 0.80 (0.19)***   X13: YEAR_2011 0.69 (0.19)*** 0.70 (0.19)***   X14: BERLIN_CO_BU  0.59 (0.30)**  0.47 (0,20)** N 322 322 322 322 R2 30.9% 30.3% 16.1% 16.6% Corrected R2 28.0% 27.4% 13.4% 14.0% *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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development is particularly high. At the same time, this seems to suggest that publicly-backed firms that do not succeed at attracting private or company builder funding exhibit less dynamic employment growth. However, more research will be needed to provide more concise answers to this matter. The regression results also provide support for Hypothesis 2 focusing on the differential effectiveness of private accelerators and com-pany builders. While we report a positive and significant relationship between the involve-ment of company builders and employment growth in models 1 and 3, no such significant effect is reported for private accelerators.  We predicted Berlin-based company builders to have a stronger impact on employment growth on their portfolio firms than other (Berlin-based) VC-backed start-ups. Both in model 2 and model 4 we report a positive and significant relationship between Berlin-based company builders and employment growth. The results suggest that portfolio firms backed by Berlin-based company builder exhibited higher growth rates than other VC-backed firms in general as well as Berlin-based firms in particular. While we observe a positive and significant effect between firm growth and being located in Berlin (so-called cluster ef-fect), the company builder effect (0.47**) is greater than the cluster effect (0.23**). The results thus provide support for Hypothesis 3 suggesting that the company builder business model more effectively puts to use the re-sources and locational advantages available in Berlin including the relatively low commer-cial, real estate prices and labour costs, the availability of qualified and young personnel as well a lack of company headquarters and classic financial intermediaries.  Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between firms in the information and com-munication industry as well as in e-commerce. Our results do not provide support for this hypothesis as we find no significant relation-
ship between the information and communi-cation industry and employment growth. While we document a positive and significant effect of e-commerce on employment growth rates in models 1 and 2, models 3 and 4 do not support this finding. By contrast, in models 3 and 4 a positive and significant relationship is observed between financial services and em-ployment growth. As the industry affiliation is not stable across the different models, Hy-pothesis 4 must be rejected. While industry affiliation per se does not seem to be sufficient to explain differential employment growth rates, the types of investors involved in the financing of portfolio firms seem to provide a more meaningful explanation.   
7 Conclusion 
Over the course of the past ten years, private incubation financing has gained traction in Germany. On the one hand, as of 2010 private accelerators have become more widespread, which is also a result of increasing activities by strategic firms migrating into incubation finance. On the other hand, a boom in the number of company builders has been ob-served over the last years. An overview of the existing literature on company builders sug-gests that these investors developed in line with the structure of the financing and innova-tion system in the respective nations. Against this backdrop, this study examined the deter-minants of employment growth among VC-backed firms with a particular focus on com-pany builders as these investors are particu-larly prominent in the German VC market. 20 company builders in total were documented and we estimate that funding by these inves-tors amounted to 1.2 billion euros, doubling the investments by private VC investors in 2015. In order to gauge the impact of different types of investors on the employment growth of their portfolio firms as well as the role of the industry affiliation and location of the 
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portfolio firms, four different regression mod-els with 322 firms were estimated. The results indicate a positive and significant effect be-tween the employment growth rates of firms backed by company builders (Hypothesis 1). By contrast, no such effect is observed for private accelerators (Hypothesis 2). As com-pany builder activity in the German VC market is strongly concentrated on Berlin, we tested the relationship between Berlin-based com-pany builders and employment growth rates (Hypothesis 3). We report a positive and sig-nificant effect of these company builders on firm growth exceeding the cluster effect, which we observe among Berlin-based firms. As the number of VC firms and supporting organizations surged in parallel with the es-tablishment and the increasing activity of Ber-lin-based company builders, company build-ers seem to represent an important driver of the growth dynamic observed in Berlin’s start-up ecosystem. With respect to industry affilia-tion, we do not observe stable results that allow us to support our Hypothesis 4. While the first two models suggest a positive and significant impact of e-commerce firms and employment growth, the models 3 and 4 sug-gest such a relationship between financial services firms.  It remains to be seen whether the success of company builders in Germany will spread internationally. The relatively low number of such investors in United States, in which they 
originated, does not seem to support this view. By contrast, we expect company build-ers to flourish and to be particularly effective in finance and innovation systems character-ized by particular deficiencies. Many studies have shown the relative weakness of the Ger-man financial system compared to liberal market economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the Ger-man financial system has been undergoing a catch-up process over the last years in which company builders seem to be an important element. The German innovation system has been associated with an aversion for risk, ex-celling at incremental innovation and provid-ing workers with long-term employment per-spectives. As an institution, company builders reduce the risk for external investors as well as for entrepreneurs. At the same time, the company builders’ broad service portfolio including e.g. in IT-programming, marketing and recruitment proves to be highly effective in facilitating the serial formation of new ven-tures. Compared to more classic VC investors, company builders also allow firms to rapidly move along learning curves thus reducing time to market considerably. In light of these findings, it seems likely that company builders will have a place in the German innovation system in the future.        
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